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Abstract
Protecting communication content at scale is a difficult
task, and TLS is the protocol most commonly used to
do so. However, it has been shown that deploying it
in a truly secure fashion is challenging for a large frac-
tion of online service operators. While Let’s Encrypt
was specifically built and launched to promote the adop-
tion of HTTPS, this paper aims to understand the rea-
sons for why it has been so hard to deploy TLS correctly
and studies the usability of the deployment process for
HTTPS. We performed a series of experiments with 28
knowledgable participants and revealed significant us-
ability challenges that result in weak TLS configurations.
Additionally, we conducted expert interviews with 7 ex-
perienced security auditors. Our results suggest that the
deployment process is far too complex even for people
with proficient knowledge in the field, and that server
configurations should have stronger security by default.
While the results from our expert interviews confirm the
ecological validity of the lab study results, they addition-
ally highlight that even educated users prefer solutions
that are easy to use. An improved and less vulnerable
workflow would be very beneficial to finding stronger
configurations in the wild.
1 Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL) are fundamental cryptographic
protocols to secure information in transit across com-
puter networks and are employed to ensure privacy and
data integrity between two communicating parties. They
are used hundreds of million of times every day world-
wide in applications such as web browsers, smartphone
apps or in email communication. Recent studies on TLS
usage in the Internet ecosystem for both HTTPS [16, 25]
and email [24, 31], however, revealed that a large
fraction of communication endpoints are poorly secured
and suspectible to a broad array of possible attacks
(e.g., Heartbleed [3] and DROWN [11]). Additionally,
human-centric studies [20] have shown that warnings
are still clicked through and that users have little to no
understanding regarding the implications of visiting a
website without a valid certificate. Even worse, a large
number of services and websites still refrains from using
TLS by default for all communication channels despite
all efforts in propagating the use of encryption. While
the initiative Let’s Encrypt was specifically launched to
offer free certificates that are trusted by all browsers, it is
not yet ubiquitiously used for various reasons, e.g., the
lack of Extended Validation (EV) Ceritificates. Besides
that, Let’s Encrypt still requires to be configured at least
once.
To date, most studies on human-centric concerns
focused on non-expert end users and, to the best of our
knowledge, no user study has yet been conducted to
examine the usability of the TLS deployment process
directly. Our contribution aims to fill this gap by pre-
senting the first user study with expert users to identify
key usability issues in the deployment process of TLS
that lead to insecure configurations. We conducted lab
sessions that lasted 2 hours each with 28 university
students from 14 to 18 December 2015. Data was
collected via a think-aloud protocol as well as an entry
and exit questionnaire. In addition we collected the
bash and browser histories and the resulting server
configuration files. We focused on Apache, as this
is the most common web server to date [7] (A query
at censys.io resulted in 20,890,000 websites using
Apache). We found that configuring TLS on Apache
is perceived as a challenging task even by experienced
users. Our results suggest that administrators struggle
with important security decisions (e.g., choosing the
right cipher suites) which are mainly driven by concerns
about compatibility. Furthermore, our participants had
a hard time finding reliable sources on the Internet to
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support their decision making process. The configu-
ration options in Apache are perceived as difficult to
understand and therefore an additional source of error.
Through our expert interviews, we collected evidence
that insufficiently secure configurations – like those
from the majority of participants from our lab study –
are frequently encountered during security audits. Our
results shed light on major challenges from an expert
user’s perspective. We are confident that our results are
a good baseline for the development of improved tools
and policies that are better tied to the expert users’ needs.
The contributions of this paper thus are:
• a lab study with 28 participants to explore usabil-
ity challenges in the TLS configuration process
• expert interviews with 7 security auditors to pro-
vide a baseline for ecological validity and to further
explore potential usability improvements and rec-
ommendations for the deployment process.
2 Background & Related Work
Transport Layer Security is the foundation of today’s
web security. Several application layer protocols use
TLS to secure their online communication. The most
widely used protocol is HTTPS, i.e., TLS provides confi-
dentiality, authenticity and integrity for HTTP. Currently,
TLS 1.2 [14] is the most recent version of the SSL/TLS
protocol family, with TLS 1.3 on the horizon.1 Besides
securing the majority of today’s web traffic, researchers
have found several challenges regarding TLS, which are
vigorously discussed in the literature [13,37]. Guidelines
and best practices for a proper TLS deployment have also
been published [12, 38]. The goals of TLS include ex-
tensibility and interoperability. This includes the ability
to change the quality of the used certificate, settings of
used cryptographic primitives (cipher suites), enabling
of TLS extensions, use of different TLS versions and
the use of additional security features like HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) [23] and HTTP Public Key
Pinning (HPKP) [18]. In the last years, many studies
focused on empirically testing the quality of TLS con-
figurations by using Internet-wide scanning techniques
and showed that the TLS landscape is diverse and full of
misconfigurations. Lee et al. [29] analyzed the supported
SSL/TLS versions, the EFF started to analyze used cer-
tificates [17] with the most comprehensive study by Du-
rumeric et al. [16] and VanderSloot et al. [42]. With
a newly introduced search engine it is also possible to
monitor the ecosystem more easily [15]. Ristic [36] an-
alyzed different parameters and evaluated the quality by
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13
a defined metric [2]. Huang et al. [26] surveyed the use
of cipher suites and Kranch and Bonneau [28] scanned
domains for HSTS and public key pinning.
Most user studies regarding TLS and human-
computer interaction focus on non-expert end users
that receive certificate warnings from their browsers.
Akhawe et al. [9] performed a large-scale study on the
effectiveness of SSL browser warnings and found that
that these warnings have high click-through rates, i.e.,
70.2% of Google Chrome’s SSL warnings did not pre-
vent users from visiting the initially requested insecure
site. Harbach et al. [22] presented an empirical analy-
sis of the influence of linguistic properties on the per-
ceived difficulty of descriptive text in warning messages
and found that the several steps can help to improve text
understandability.
Several studies have been conducted to improve SSL
warnings [20, 21, 41, 43]: E.g., Sunshine et al. [41] con-
ducted a survey to examine Internet users’ reactions to
and understanding of current SSL warnings. Based on
their findings, they designed new warnings and showed
that they performed significantly better. Weber et al. [43]
used a participatory design approach to improve SSL
warnings. Felt et al. [21] explored reasons for higher
click-through rates for SSL warnings in Google Chrome
compared to Mozilla Firefox. They also showed that the
design of warnings can lead users towards safer deci-
sions.
Oltrogge et al. [33] conducted an extensive study on
the applicability of pinning for non-browser software as
in Android apps. They found that only a quarter of their
participants understood the concept of pinning. Based on
their findings, they presented a web application to sup-
port developers in making the right decisions and guiding
them through the correct deployment.
Fahl et al. [19] presented the first study with system
administrators and found that many of their participants
wished for more simplicity, e.g., simpler interfaces and
automatic certificate renewal. Their results furthermore
highlight the need for a better technical education of re-
sponsible personnel. In comparison to our lab experi-
ments, the results from Fahl et al. [19] are based on self-
reported data gathered via an online questionnaire and
therefore provide a baseline for our study.
3 Lab Experiments
In the following, we describe the methodology used to
collect and analyze the data from the lab study.
3.1 Study Design and Procedure
In order to elicit a picture of usability challenges of
TLS deployment from an administrator’s point of
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view, we conducted a series of lab experiments with
28 participants. As described in Section 3.2, we re-
cruited students with expert knowledge in the field of
security and privacy-enhancing protocols at our univer-
sity who fulfilled the criteria to potentially work as an
administrator or were actually working as administrators.
Our experiments proceeded as follows: After the
recruitment phase, the participants were invited to the
lab where they were shortly briefed about the purpose of
our study. After signing a consent form, they received
the study assignment as presented in Appendix A. In the
given scenario, they assumed the role of an administrator
of an SME who is in charge of securing the communi-
cation to an Apache web server with HTTPS in order to
pass a security audit. The server system to secure was
based on Raspian, a Debian-based Linux distribution.
The Apache version in use was 2.4.11. We prepared
and implemented a fictive Certificate Authority (CA) in
order to facilitate the process of getting a valid certificate
and to remove any bias introduced by the procedures
from a certain CA. The fictive CA was available through
a simple web interface and required the submission of
a valid CSR (certificate signing request) for issuing a
valid certificate. The user interface was very simplistic
and the browser on the local machine already trusted
our CA. Figure 2 in Appendix A shows a screenshot
of the user interface. We opted for this study setting
as we solely wanted to focus on the actual deployment
process instead of the interaction with a CA. There was
no existing TLS configuration on the system, hence
the participants had to start a new configuration from
scratch. We chose Apache for our experimental setup
as to date, Apache maintains a clear lead regarding in
usage share statistics, followed by Microsoft and nginx,
e.g., [1].
We instructed the participants to make the configura-
tion as secure as possible, whereas the assignment did not
contain any specific security requirements, such as which
cipher suites to use or whether to deploy HSTS or not.
In order to collect data, we used a think-aloud protocol.
While the participants were working on the task, they
articulated their thoughts while an experimenter seated
next to them observed their work and took notes. We re-
frained from video recording due to the results from our
pre-test during which we filmed the sessions and noticed
a severe impact on the participants’ behavior. The par-
ticipants from the pre-study also explicitly reported that
they perceived the cameras as disruptive and distracting,
even though they were placed in a discreet way.
In addition to the notes from the observation, we cap-
tured the bash and browser history and the final config-
uration files. After completing the task, the participants
were asked to fill out a short questionnaire with closed-
and open-ended questions which covered basic demo-
graphics, previous security experience in industry and
reflections on the experiment. The complete assignment
and questionnaire can be found in the Appendix of this
paper.
As a result, we had a collection of both qualitative and
quantitative data that was further used for analysis as de-
scribed in Section 3.3.
3.2 Recruitment and Participants
In contrast to most previous studies in the area of TLS
usability, we focused on users that have proficient knowl-
edge in the field of security and privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies. As it was very difficult to recruit participants
from companies, irrespective of a financial incentive, we
decided to recruit participants at the university and tar-
geted students that had previously completed a set of se-
curity courses similar to recent studies with expert users,
e.g., [8, 35, 44].
To ensure that our sample reflected job requirements
of real world system administrators we reviewed open
job advertisements for system administrators to deter-
mine requirements for participation in our study. We then
invited a selected set of students that completed several
security-related courses to take an online quiz to addi-
tionally assess their knowledge irrespective of their pre-
viously issued grades. The full set of questions from the
quiz can be found in Appendix A. The quiz as well as the
required previously completed university courses were
selected based on a review of 15 open job advertisements
for system administrators in our region. The top 30 stu-
dents with the best scores were then invited to participate
in the lab study, and 28 of them did. The participants’
completed the quiz with scores ranging from 8.21 and 10
(out of 10). The average score was 9.15 (median = 9.37).
The average time to complete the quiz was 6.1 minutes.
Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of the partici-
pants: 2 participants were female, 26 were male; the age
range was 21 to 32 with a median of 23. Their experience
working in industry ranged from 2 to 120 months with a
median of 25 months. 17 of our 28 participants were al-
ready experienced system administrators and reported to
have deployed TLS before.
We are confident that our participants are suitable
to explore usability challenges in TLS deployment that
real-world system administrators face. To furthermore
strengthen ecological validity of our results we con-
ducted a set of interviews with security auditors (Sec-
tion 5).
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Demographic Number Percent
Gender
Female 2 10%
Male 26 90%
Age
Min. 21
Max. 32
Median 23
Months worked in industry
Min. 2
Max. 120
Median 25
Experienced as sysadmin
Yes 17 60%
No 11 40%
Configured TLS before
Yes 17 60%
No 11 40%
Currently administrating
Company web server 5 17%
Private web server 17 83%
Table 1: Participant characteristics from the lab experi-
ments. n=28
3.3 Data Analysis
For a qualitative analysis of the observation protocols we
performed a series of iterative coding which is often used
in usable security research to develop models and theo-
ries from qualitative data [27, 34, 39]. Our approach in-
volved several steps in the analysis process and was im-
plemented as follows: At first, two researchers traversed
all data segments independently point-by-point and as-
signed descriptive codes. This process is referred to as
open coding. The two researchers performed the initial
coding independently from each other to minimize the
susceptibility of biased interpretation. We evaluated the
quality of our initial codes and agreed on a final set of
codes which was then used to code the protocols. Our
analysis showed a good inter-rater agreement between
the two coders (Cohen’s κ=0.78). On the resulting initial
set of coded data we performed axial coding to look for
explanations and relationships among the codes and top-
ics to uncover structures in the data. Then we performed
selective coding to put the results together and derive a
theory from the data.
In order to structure the data from the open-ended ques-
tions collected through the questionnaire we used an it-
erative coding process. Hence we went through the col-
lected data and produced an initial set of codes. Then
we revised the retrieved codes and discussed recurring
themes, patterns and interconnections. After agreeing on
a final set of codes, we coded the entire data. As a result
of our analysis, we obtained a picture of usability chal-
lenges in the deployment process which is presented in
Section 4, grouped by themes.
To evaluate the (mostly) quantitative data acquired via
the bash/browser history and Apache log files, we ap-
plied metrics and measures to evaluate the quality of the
resulting configuration.
4 Results
In this section we present the results from our lab study
which are based on the data from the think-aloud proto-
col, the collected log files and the self-reported data from
the exit-questionnaire.
4.1 Security Evaluation
We based our evaluation criteria on Qualy’s SSL Test.2
We consider this rating scheme a useful benchmark
to assess the quality of a TLS configuration based
on the state of the art recommendations from various
RFCs [37, 38] and with respect to the most recently
discovered vulnerabilities and attacks in the protocol.
Since web services have different requirements, e.g.,
backward compatibility for outdated browsers, there is
no universally applicable recommendation to get the
highest grade. Still, the rating is widely accepted and
applicable to generic web services like in our study.
It must be mentioned that this benchmark reflects the
best-case scenario at the time of writing, but could
be different in the future if new vulnerabilities are
discovered.
The rating of the evaluation criteria is expressed with
a grade from A to F and composed out of three inde-
pendent values: (1) protocol support (30%), (2) key
exchange (30%) and (3) cipher strength (40%). Some
properties, e.g., support for the RC4 cipher cap the
overall grade as shown in Table 3. Table 2 summarizes
the results of a security evaluation based on the final
configuration per participant with additional information
in Table 3. The full set of evaluation criteria based on the
metrics used in Qualy’s SSL Test is listed in Appendix A.
Only four participants managed to deploy an A grade
TLS configuration, P24 received the best overall score.
B was the most commonly awarded grade (15 out of 28).
Four participants did not manage to deploy a valid TLS
configuration in the given time (P7, P18, P23, P26). Two
2https://www.ssllabs.com
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participants (P10 and P19) encrypted their private keys,
the passphrases were “abc123” and “pass”. One of these
two did not share the passphrase with us, however it was
easy to brute-force.
Fortunately, none of our participants chose a key size
smaller than 2048 for their RSA key. 15 participants
chose 2k- and eight chose 4k-sized keys. Five out of the
28 participants deployed the certificate chain correctly,
which is necessary to receive a grade better than B ac-
cording to our rating scheme.
Two participants did not make use of the study CA and
used self-signed certificates. Only one participant en-
abled a TLS version lower than TLS 1.0 (P8), another
participant had all versions but TLS 1.2 disabled (P14).
Only two participants configured RC4 support and only
one configuration (P8) was vulnerable to the POODLE
attack as SSL 3 was still supported. 14 participants fully
configured forward secrecy, the remaining participants
with valid configurations managed to at least partially
support it. Eleven participants included HSTS headers
to improve the security of their configuration and only
two participants deployed HPKP.
To determine whether the distribution of SSL Test
grades from our lab study reflects those from config-
urations found in the wild, we consider the estimation
from SSL Pulse [6] who regularly publishes data sets of
grade distribution measures based on the Alexa Top 1
Million. This data set as of the time our study was con-
ducted contains 141.890 surveyed sites of which 34.1%
were graded with A, 20.2% with B, 27.1% with C and
18.5% failed. Based on the 24 valid configurations from
our study, 25% of the study configurations were graded
with A, 67% with B and 8% with C. Given that the data
set from SSL Pulse [6] contains websites with potentially
higher security requirements or sites were administrators
were presumably given more time to obtain a secure con-
figuration. In particular the possibly very complex struc-
tures of real-world websites, as well as the inclusion of
third-party content, make our study non-representative.
4.2 TLS Deployment Model
Our qualitative analysis of the think-aloud protocols
from our lab study yielded a process model for a success-
ful TLS configuration. All participants who managed
a valid configuration in the given time can be mapped
to the stages presented in this model. The four partic-
ipants who did not manage to deploy TLS in the given
time significantly deviate from this model. We divide
the steps from our model into two phases, a setup phase
and a hardening phase. We refer to the setup phase as
to a set of tasks to get a basic TLS configuration, i.e.,
the service is reachable via https if requested. The hard-
ening phase comprises all necessary tasks to get a con-
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a successful work-
flow.
figuration which is widely considered secure with re-
spect to the metrics defined in A. Figure 1 shows our
deployment model. Participants who achieved at least
a basic configuration successfully completed all steps of
the setup phase, while better-graded configurations com-
pleted some steps from the hardening phase as well. We
identified iterative (tool-supported) security testing as a
key element for a successful hardening phase, since the
participants relied on external sources to evaluate the
quality of their configuration.
4.3 Usability Challenges in TLS Deploy-
ment
In the following, we present the usability challenges
identified through our analysis of qualitative data from
the think-aloud protocols and the quantitative data from
the collected log files.
Searching for information and finding the right work-
flow. Except for 3 experienced participants, who ex-
plicitly searched for tutorials they were aware of (e.g.,
bettercrypto.org), the study participants visited a
high number of websites and used multiple sources of in-
formation. The information sources were diverse regard-
ing their suggested deployment approaches and informa-
tion quality respectively. We frequently observed that a
participant started to follow an approach from one tuto-
rial and soon had to switch to another as the presented
approach was not feasible for our deployment scenario
and the given server configuration.
The lowest number of visited websites during the
lab study was 20 (P21). In contrary, participant P4
visited 147 websites during the given time. The average
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P1 A 2 90 90 95 web.local 4096 3  # # #    # #   #
P2 B 3 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1  # # #    # #  # #
P3 B 2,3 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1  # # #    # #   #
P4 A 90 90 95 web.local 2048 3  # # #    # #  # #
P5 B 90 90 95 web.local 4096 1  # # #    # #   #
P6 B 3 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1  # # #    # #  # #
P7 Not valid
P8 C 3-6,8 90 90 50 web.local 2048 1  # #   # #   G# # #
P9 B 1-3 100 90 95 web.local 4096 1  # # #    # #    
P10 B 1-3 90 90 95 web.local 4096 1  # # #    # #    
P11 B 3,4 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1   # #    # # G# # #
P12 B 2,3 90 90 95 web.local 4096 1  # # #  #  # #   #
P13 B 3 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1  # # #    # # G# # #
P14 A- 4 90 90 100 raspberrypi 2048 1 # # # # # #  # # G# # #
P15 C 4,7 50 90 95 - 2048 1 # # # #     # G# # #
P16 A- 4 90 90 95 web.local 2048 3  # # #    # # G# # #
P17 B 2,3 90 90 95 web.local 3096 1  # # #    # #   #
P18 Not valid
P19 B 2,3 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1   # #    # #   #
P20 B 2,3 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1  # # #    # #   #
P21 B 3,4 90 90 95 Test 2048 1  # # #    # # G# # #
P22 B 3,4 90 90 95 web.local 2048 1  # # #    # # G# # #
P23 Not valid
P24 A 2 90 90 97 web.local 2048 3  # # # #   # #   #
P25 B 3 90 90 95 SME 4096 1  # # #    # # G# # #
P26 Not valid
P27 B 3,4 90 90 95 web.local 4096 1  # # #    # # G# # #
P28 A 2 90 90 95 web.local 4096 3  # # #    # #   #
Table 2: Security evaluation of the final TLS configuration per participant.
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1 Highlight HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) deployed on this server. Yay!
2 Highlight HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) with long duration deployed on this server.
3 Warning This server’s certificate chain is incomplete. Grade capped to B.
4 Warning The server does not support Forward Secrecy with the reference browsers.
5 Warning This server accepts RC4 cipher, but only with older protocol versions. Grade capped to B.
6 Warning The server supports only older protocols, but not the current best TLS 1.2. Grade capped to C.
7 Warning This server uses RC4 with modern protocols. Grade capped to C.
8 Error This server is vulnerable to the POODLE attack. If possible, disable SSL 3 to mitigate. Grade capped to C.
Table 3: Errors / Highlights / Warnings as referred to in Table 2.
number of visited websites over all participants was 60
(median=49.5, sd=27). We consider this a relatively
high number given the low amount of time. Table 5
lists the most visited websites. The top-most visited site
points to a German Ubuntu and Linux wiki that is fre-
quently updated. The documentation for SSL on Apache
(second-most visited site) contains detailed information
on certificate creation and retrieval but only basic
information on hardening. In contrast, sslabs.com and
bettercrypto.org contain comprehensive tutorials on
hardening but require a detailed understanding of the un-
derlying fundamentals. The tutorial from raymii.org
provides step by step instructions but is not regularly
updated. Most participants expressed annoyance and
vexation about the incompatibility of the different infor-
mation sources. We also found that the number of visited
websites (high, medium, low) does not impact the qual-
ity of the resulting configuration, but this result is not
significant in our sample with χ2(0.23327892,6)> 0.05.
“I have absolutely no idea what I’m doing. Neither
am I aware of whether my online source is trustworthy.
(P23)”
Creating a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). A
CSR is a block of PEM-encoded text which is sent to
a CA to request a TLS certificate. It therefore contains
information that will be included in the certificate such
as organization name and common name (FQDN) and
enables users to send their public key along with some
information that identifies the domain name in a stan-
dardized way. When creating a CSR, the user is asked
to fill out the respective information. In order to create a
CSR, the user has to create a key pair. Our results sug-
gest that many users do not understand the purpose and
concept of a CSR, i.e., who it is authenticating towards
whom. 19 out of 30 participants from the lab study had to
create two or more requests due to errors in the CSR cre-
ation. The most common error was that they did not fill
out the requested common name field correctly (14 par-
ticipants) and thus did not receive a valid certificate for
their domain. In the end, 20 participants created a CSR
Participant ID Visited websites Grade
Most visited sites
P4 147 A
P19 116 B
P8 111 C
P2 109 B
P7 116 -
Least visited sites
P21 20 B
P12 36 B
P5 49 B
P10 49 B
P18 50 -
Table 4: Participants and their cumulative number of vis-
ited sites and overall rating.
with the correct common name as shown in Table 2. As
this is a common error in practice, some CAs even high-
light that the common name(s) can be altered later on.
This is especially useful when adding TLS support for
subdomains. Second, two participants (P14 and P15) did
not fully understand the difference between a CSR and a
(self-signed) certificate. Six participants initially created
a self-signed certificate instead of a CSR and tried to up-
load it to the CA. According to the self-reported work ex-
perience, this happened to participants regardless of their
experience. E.g., P15 reported to have recently deployed
TLS on Apache and still tried to upload a self-signed cer-
tificate to the CA. Four participants recognized the error
after receiving an error message from the CA and then
created a correct CSR including a correct common name.
Choosing the appropriate cipher suites. In TLS, ci-
pher suites are used to determine how secure commu-
nication takes place. Cipher suites are composed from
building blocks in order to achieve security through di-
versity. A person in charge of configuring TLS has to
select cipher suites that provide authentication and en-
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URL Visitors
wiki.ubuntuusers.de/Apache/SSL 25
httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/ssl/ 20
www.ssllabs.com/ 16
bettercrypto.org 15
raymii.org/s/tutorials/Strong_SSL_Security_.. 14
httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/mod_ssl 11
Table 5: Top most visited websites.
cryption that is considered strong. However, this is a task
that requires a deep and up-to-date understanding on the
underlying algorithms in order to make informed deci-
sions about which cipher suites to support. In the course
of our lab experiments, all participants who came to this
point during the configuration assignment were aware of
the fact that they had to manually select cipher suites to
secure the communication. The decision making process
was exclusively based on search results and suggestions
from online resources without questioning. Some par-
ticipants also referred to recently published blog posts
where they read about the disadvantages of a certain al-
gorithm. This implies that the quality of the used infor-
mation source is crucial for the overall security of the
configuration as our participants lacked profound knowl-
edge and thus had to trust their source of information.
Table 2 shows how the selected cipher suites impact the
quality of the configuration.
Strict HTTPS. After finishing an initial valid config-
uration, most participants enforced strict HTTPS as a
first step of the hardening phase. Some were annoyed by
the fact that HTTPS does not immediately replace HTTP
as soon as it is available. Most participants were ini-
tially confused when they tested their configuration via
the browser and were redirected via http when they en-
tered the URL without the http(s):// prefix. They then
spent a significant amount of time to configure the vir-
tual host and the respective ports correctly, mostly also
due to misleading or incomplete information from online
sources.
Multiple configuration files. All but six participants
said that they found the configuration file structure con-
fusing, regardless of their prior experience with Apache.
P14 found it particularly challenging to find the right
configuration files. According to the think-aloud proto-
col, this was the main challenge that in the end resulted
in an invalid configuration. Several participants copied
and pasted entries between different configuration files
or had double entries, e.g., for SSLEngineOn. Nine par-
ticipants also struggled with loading the modules, e.g.,
P18 did not understand where to load the modules in the
configuration. Many participants were also not aware of
where and how to create a new virtual host which listens
on 443. P23, for example, did not understand the differ-
ences between the http.conf and apache.conf which dis-
tracted him/her from the TLS-specific tasks and security-
critical decisions.
Finding the right balance between security and com-
patibility. We observed that the majority of our par-
ticipants struggled with the definition of a secure con-
figuration. In our assignment we just stated that the
configuration should be as secure as possible to with-
stand an audit, without specifying any key properties.
Hence, the participants themselves had to make the deci-
sions. About 15 participants expressed concerns regard-
ing compatibility when configuring SSL/TLS versions
and cipher suites. A majority of them, however, decided
in favor of a securer option, e.g., disabling all TLS ver-
sions < TLS v1.1 and thus refraining from supporting
older versions of IE.
4.4 Impact of Prior Experience with TLS
As shown in Table 1 a significant proportion of the par-
ticipant pool has already administered or is currently ad-
ministering a server and 17 participants have configured
TLS before. Regardless of our relatively small sample
which is due to the qualitative nature of our study, we
provide statistical significance of the interplay between
prior experience and the resulting security grade from
our study. Table 6 shows the cumulative amount of par-
ticipants that achieved a certain security grade during
the study with respect to their prior experience. None
of the participants who did not manage to provide a
valid configuration in the given time had prior experi-
ence with server administration in a corporate environ-
ment. However, Table 6 shows that the majority of expe-
rienced users was not able to provide an A grade config-
uration. A significance test with χ2(7.9982,3) = 0.046
provides evidence to suggest that there is an association
between prior experience with configuring TLS and the
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grade of a participant’s TLS configuration from the lab
study. We could not identify dependence between prior
employment as system administrator and the SSL Test
grade based on the configuration from the lab study with
χ2(6.7667,3) = 0.07.
4.5 Perceptions of Usability
After the lab experiments, the study participants filled
out a short online questionnaire and reported reflections
on the assignment. 18 participants reported that they
thought they finished the assignment completely, while
nine thought that there were still some configuration
steps missing. One participant was not sure about
whether or not he/she finished the task. While ten
participants perceived the assigned task as difficult and
three as very difficult, only four participants thought
that it was easy and one that it was very easy. Twelve
participants rated the difficulty as neutral.
We also asked our participants what they think are the
most severe usability pitfalls in the deployment process.
In the following, we provide a respective list. Most fre-
quently mentioned were lack of best practice tutorials
(19), followed by misleading terminology (15) and weak
default configurations (12).
Lack of best practice tutorials. According to our par-
ticipants, it was difficult to determine a best practice on
how to deploy TLS. Our participants reported that they
came across outdated or simply wrong information in on-
line tutorials. 13 participants also mentioned that most
tutorials were not generic, but still not specific enough to
apply them to the system given in the assignment.
Misleading terminology and error messages. Espe-
cially with respect to interactions with the CA, partici-
pants expressed confusion about the terminology. Some
accidentally uploaded a self-signed certificate instead of
a CSR and found the file endings difficult to handle and
to distinguish, e.g., .key, .pem, .crt.
Weak default configuration. Eight participants ex-
plicitly criticized the high effort necessary to harden the
configuration, as too many cipher suites are enabled by
default. Also, they criticized that the selection of cipher
suites is a time-consuming task that requires profound
background knowledge in order to make an informed
decision and that bad decisions yield major security
vulnerabilities. One participant also suggested a simpli-
fied configuration option including a two- or three-way
variable to disable certain cipher suites (e.g., tinfoil hat
vs. maximum compatibility). Four participants also
stated that they would prefer if web servers had TLS
configured by default.
“It seems that there is already a certificate called
snakeoil, why can’t I use this one?” (P7)
Confusing config file structure. During the configu-
ration process, many participants perceived the Apache
config file structure as confusing and experienced it as
a severe source for errors. We also observed that some
participants had simple copy/paste errors in their config
files which highly distracted them from the actual main
task.
“There are multiple config files in /etc/apache2, how
and where do I have to load modules?” (P18)
“Why is there a snakeoil certificate in the config file?”
(P22)
Complex workflow. Six participants explicitly stated
that the workflow itself is too complex due to the differ-
ent approaches and branches that can be taken during the
configuration process as well as the dependencies of the
subtasks. Three participants stated these factors hindered
them in finding the source of an error afterwards.
“The configuration process is fiddly and one has to
google tons of pages to get it right. Even then one can-
not be sure to have a good configuration because SSL
vulnerabilities are discovered almost on a regular basis.”
(P9)
Too much background knowledge required. Many
participants expressed their concern about the high
amount of background knowledge required to success-
fully configure TLS in a secure way. Also, the fact that
a TLS configuration must be well maintained and fre-
quently updated requires the person in charge to be in-
formed about the latest TLS attacks and other vulner-
abilities which our participants considered infeasible in
practice.
Confusing permissions. Five participants also stated
that they found it hard to choose the correct location and
permissions for the certificate and private key.
5 Expert Interviews
In order to address ecological validity, we conducted ad-
ditional expert interviews with security consultants and
auditors about their experiences with insecure TLS con-
figurations. In this section, we describe the interview
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Experience A B C not valid
Configured TLS before? 5 11 1 0
Worked as admin in the past 4 4 0 0
Administering company server 1 3 1 0
Private server 4 9 0 2
Table 6: Prior experience with TLS deployment and server administration.
methodology and results of these expert interviews that
were conducted in April 2016. The interview guideline
can be found in Appendix A.
5.1 Recruitment and Interview Procedure
The participants were recruited at a security conference
in Germany with participants from both academia and
industry and via emails to regional security consulting
companies. The requirements for participation currently
work as a security consultant or auditor and to have at
least 2 years of prior experience in auditing web services.
The expert interviews were conducted as semi-structured
interviews with 7 security experts from well-respected
security consulting firms in the German-speaking region.
The experts were familiar with TLS misconfigurations
and frequently encountered misconceptions on how to
combat the trade-off between compatibility and security.
The interview segments were coded using iterative cod-
ing.
5.2 Results
Our results show that auditors commonly agree that poor
usability and too complex workflows and server config-
urations result in weak TLS configurations. They also
mentioned that the deployment process must be simpli-
fied and especially the default configuration should favor
security. In the following, we discuss their responses in
detail. Six interview participants were male, one was fe-
male. The average number of months spent as a pene-
tration tester or auditor was 53.2. Two participants work
in small companies with less than 10 employees, the re-
maining participants were employed in companies with
more than 10 but less than 100 employees.
Auditing TLS configurations. All expert interview
participants reported to focus on the following config-
uration characteristics during audits: activated TLS/SSL
version, activated cipher suites, if the certificate is recog-
nized by commonly used web browsers, whether HSTS
is configured and whether public key pinning is activated.
E3 and E7 also highlighted that they particularly pay at-
tention if recently discovered attacks are mitigated. E6
and E7 also said that in addition to automated tools, they
prefer to evaluate the server configuration directly, if it is
accessible.
All seven interview participants use Qualy’s SSL Test as
the de-facto standard to evaluate public domains. They
also use selected Nessus modules3 and OpenVAS4 for
internal sites. E2, E4 and E6 also reported to use
NMap [30].
Configuration mistakes in the wild. According to the
interview participants, the main concern when deploying
TLS is compatibility. Our interviewees, however, also
mentioned that in most cases the compatibility challenge
is just a mock argument which is often used as an ex-
cuse and not fully elaborated by the responsible employ-
ees. Compatibility is a challenge for publicly available
sites where almost any client may want to access. How-
ever, it is a rather easy-to-solve problem for services that
are only accessed internally, hence the set of potentially
accessing clients is well known. Also, backward com-
patibility with older client versions (i.e., <IE7) may not
be desired for a variety of reasons beyond TLS and will
only affect a minority of clients. However, E1 and E3
also reported that finding the best fit between security
and compatibility is hard even for security experts and
often arguable. Five of the interviewed auditors also re-
ported that they often find self-signed certificates which
do not fulfil the intended purpose. E1, E2, E3 and E7
mentioned that they often encounter weak default TLS
configurations with poor ciphers and no additional secu-
rity measures (e.g., HSTS).
Two auditors mentioned that in the course of look-
ing at TLS configurations for many years, they have
never encountered HTTP public key pinning during an
audit. Also, one interview participant reported that TLS
deployment is not sufficiently streamlined in compa-
nies. According to them, most companies have multi-
ple servers with varying configurations and each one is
maintained and updated separately.
E2 also highlights that the ideal TLS configuration
has changed frequently in the last two years or algo-
3https://www.tenable.com/products/nessus-
vulnerability-scanner
4http://www.openvas.org/
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rithms have been deprecated which implies a significant
overhead for administrators to keep their configurations
up to date. E2, E4 and E7 also reported that companies
do not fully make use of the online sources available,
such as using Qualy’s SSL test for public domains.
“In most cases backward compatibility is the show-
stopper regarding proper TLS configurations.” (E3)
Concerns in the wild. We also asked our interviewees
about the concerns that admins, CSOs and other persons
in charge have regarding TLS. Our experts agreed that
especially administrators are aware that configuring TLS
is a sensitive task during which several things can go
wrong. However, lack of time seems to be a major is-
sue and administrators often do not have the resources
to get a deep understanding on the fundamentals. To
our surprise, E4 and E7 reported that they frequently
encounter responsible persons that have little or no ex-
perience with security protocols such as TLS. All inter-
view participants reported that in the course of security
audits, they also frequently find weak default configura-
tions along with little awareness regarding the weakness
of such configurations and how they could easily be hard-
ened. E7 highlighted that responsible persons even report
that they are “afraid of using crypto”. As an example (de-
scribed in 5.2), E1 explicitly mentioned HSTS which is
easy to deploy and has no impact on compatibility, but is
rarely used in practice.
Also, compatibility still remains a key concern as lack
of compatibility often leads to overloaded help lines, as
reported by E1, E6 and E7. Also, the risk of MITM at-
tacks is often underestimated and companies do not per-
ceive themselves as targets of such attacks. E7 cited an
administrator from an SME saying: “Our configuration
supports basic encryption, so this should be more than
enough... and clearly is better than no encryption.” As E2
reports, companies are often concerned about introduc-
ing encryption due to the additional performance over-
head which is in their opinion not worth the effort.
Suggested usability improvements. A common opin-
ion of all interviewees was that the default server config-
urations must be improved by simplifications and default
security options. They said that server configurations
should be secure by default, i.e., that TLS should be en-
abled by default and hence must be explicitly disabled if
necessary. E1 highlighted that Apache has a weak default
configuration for compatibility reasons and mentioned
the Caddy web server5 as a good and usable example.
Caddy comes with a TLS configuration by default and
5https://caddyserver.com/
uses Let’s Encrypt to get certificates. Also, according
to E1 the by default activated cipher suites are a good
compromise, and even OCSP stapling and HSTS are de-
ployed by default. Also, the Caddy web server automati-
cally renews certificates. E1 highlights that configuration
directives must be simplified to yield strong configura-
tions and that Caddy web server is a good example for
this paradigm. E1 also suggests that compatibility flags
which administrators can use to configure cipher suites
would be much more helpful than letting them deal with
cipher suites directly.
Regarding the deployment process in larger enter-
prises that maintain multiple servers, E1 proposes to cre-
ate a strong sample configuration on a test server and to
then deploy them on all servers. This potentially helps to
avoid outdated configurations, as the updating process is
simplified and the person in charge is aware of the TLS
configuration on all devices by knowing the essentials of
the sample configuration.
E1 also suggests to deploy everything that does not re-
sult in lower compatibility, i.e., OCSP stapling which is
commonly ignored by clients who do not understand the
according header. While public key pinning is rather dif-
ficult to fully deploy, it can easily be used in report-only
mode and thus enables to detect MITM attacks. E1 high-
lights that these additional functionalities are beneficial
for security but rarely encountered in the wild.
E3 also suggests that HTTPS should fully replace
HTTP to solve security problems. E3 also thinks that
HTTP has no fundamental benefit over HTTPS with
TLS. E3 shifts the responsibility from servers to clients
and stated that clients should be frequently updated to
support the respective ciphers. Furthermore, E3 argues
that the concept behind CAs also has its flaws, i.e., lack
of certificate transparency, certificate revocation and law-
ful interception on the CA’s side without the end user’s
consent. She/he also claims that browsers generally trust
a high number of CAs with varying trustworthiness.
E7 highlighted the need for professional education and
that “doing it right” requires experienced professionals
that keep track of the ongoing changes. E7 also sug-
gested that there is a high demand for better config-
uration guides and easier-to-use default configurations
to compensate the lack of know-how of the persons in
charge as well as to make it easier for everyone to config-
ure TLS in a secure yet compatible way. Also, this inter-
view participant said that companies should have policies
regarding encryption and compatibility to make it easier
for administrators to choose the right configuration.
6 Discussion
While related work already showed that TLS configu-
rations in the wild are often weak and thus do not suf-
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ficiently protect Internet users from MITM attacks, our
work explores the reasons for this. In comparison to most
related user studies, we focus on the expert user role in-
stead of the non-expert end user who is mostly unaware
of potential risks and clicks through warnings which are
often hard to understand and do not sufficiently commu-
nicate security risks.
We were surprised by the helplessness that we encoun-
tered during the lab study. The security auditors who par-
ticipated in our expert interviews draw a similar picture
of the administrators’ reaction when confronted with the
results of an audit which strengthens the ecological va-
lidity of our results.
For our sample, we selected top students that success-
fully completed security courses and proved their techni-
cal knowledge in an initial knowledge survey. 17 out of
28 participants were already experienced with managing
servers in a corporate environment. We also compare the
technical knowledge of our participants with those from
Fahl et al. [19] who surveyed 755 webmasters. Their re-
sults suggest that webmasters often lack of a detailed un-
derstanding of the SSL security features and that they are
not sufficiently educated. Fahl et al. [19] also found that
real world webmasters heavily rely on online sources to
compensate for their lack of knowledge.
Based on this comparison and the results from our ex-
pert interviews we are confident that our sample is suited
to explore usability challenges and reflects the diverse
knowledge of administrators in the wild.
Our results suggest that poor usability is a key is-
sue and by far the main reason for weak configurations.
Through both our lab study and the expert interviews we
found that even professionals lack the knowledge regard-
ing the underlying cryptographic fundamentals such as
cipher suites and even basic concepts like the role of cer-
tificates. This result shows that there is a high demand for
better default configurations and/or tool support to pre-
vent administrators from dealing with mechanisms they
cannot fully understand.
As stated in Section 4.1, we based our evaluation cri-
teria on Qualy’s SSL Test to evaluate the configurations
from our lab study. Although these metrics are consid-
ered a good benchmark to assess TLS configuration, not
all of them are feasible for every real-world scenario.
For example, HPKP in theory is a mechanism to miti-
gate MITM attacks with fraudulent certificates but poses
additional risks and challenges in practice as key man-
agement for HPKP is hard to manage for long tail web-
sites. Possible solutions are to pin the CA certificate and
to use a backup key or to use CAA (Certification Author-
ity Authorization) DNS records to allow domain owners
to specify which CAs are allowed to issue certificates for
the respective domain. During our lab experiments, two
participants started deploying HPKP. However, from the
data we collected during the experiments, it is unlcear to
what extent the participants who wanted to deploy HPKP
were aware of the implied key management challenges.
In December 2015, the initiative Let’s Encrypt re-
leased its non-profit CA that provides free domain-
validated X.509 certificates and software to enable instal-
lation and maintenance of these certificates was launched
to make it easier for administrators to deploy TLS. Since
then, Let’s Encrypt changed the TLS market signifcantly.
It issued over 27 million active certificates for over 12
million registered domains (Feb. 2017). It is often called
the largest CA, but is still not clear how much this in-
fluenced the TLS ecosystem, since many certificates are
used for less popular web sites [4, 5]. However, Let’s
Encrypt is not directly improving TLS configurations. It
seems that the prime goal, the process of certificate is-
suance was improved, but the full TLS configuration is
still a manual process. Some plugins (e.g., for Apache in-
tegration) automatically set some TLS configuration pa-
rameters (e.g., protocol version, cipher suites) to a bal-
anced configuration in terms of security and backward
compatibility. However, it does not include other param-
eters like HSTS or the DH prime configuration. There-
fore, configurations with certificates issued by Let’s En-
crypt are not generically comparable with other con-
figurations, but it is clearly an opportunity to also im-
prove and automate the configuration process in the fu-
ture. Hence, Let’s Encrypt does not entirely automate
the workflow as presented in Figure 1. In fact it aimes to
ease the creation of a CSR and the interaction with the
CA. Regardless of these substantial improvements, Let’s
Encrypt needs to be configured at least once. While there
are dedicated tools available (e.g. ACME) it remains to
show to what extent the initial effort in configuring an
Apache web server actually decreases.
As mentioned by our security experts, there are al-
ready servers with a focus on better security: they let
their users make configurations less secure if desired in-
stead of providing no security by default and thus forcing
users to deploy security themselves. Also, they high-
light the demand for easier user interfaces for config-
uration purposes which corresponds to the findings of
Fahl et al. [19]. Our results also suggest that expert users
are often unable to decide on the appropriate level of se-
curity, which highlights the need for cross-organizational
guidelines and policies.
As creating a basic TLS configuration also involves
complex decisions (such as choosing the appropriate key
length) it is difficult for administrators to maintain or cor-
rect errors and wrong decisions.
Both the results from the lab study and the expert in-
terviews highlight that the complex deployment process
should be simplified, and that the difference between a
basic correct configuration and a secure one should not
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be too broad. Hence we suggest that newly designed
servers and/or supportive tools should merge the setup
and the hardening phase resulting in a best-case working
configuration if all steps are completed – which can then
be downgraded if necessary.
6.1 Limitations
A severe limitation of our lab study is that we only
looked at the initial deployment process and excluded
long-term maintenance effects, such as certificate re-
newal and the administrators’ reactions to newly discov-
ered vulnerabilities. The main reason is that it is difficult
to reliably study long-term effects in the lab. In the fu-
ture, we plan to conduct an additional case study in a
corporate environment to observe long-term effects over
a number of years. Also, as our study was performed in
the lab, the participants did not have a deep background
of the notional company they were administrating for the
study. Our primary goal was to recruit participants who
were fully employed as system administrators, but un-
fortunately did not manage to get enough responses re-
spectively commitments for participation. Therefore, we
chose to recruit participants among our computer science
students. To overcome this bias, we selected top students
that successfully completed security courses with good
grades and completed an initial assessment test. As our
results suggest, many of them were already experienced
with managing servers and some had even worked as sys-
tem administrators in companies and other organizations.
We therefore believe that our data is suited to explore us-
ability challenges. Our expert interviews with security
auditors underline the ecological validity of the results
from our lab study and suggest that configurations found
in the wild are even less secure than those generated by
our participants during the lab study. Another limitation
of our study is that we instructed the participants to de-
ploy the securest possible configuration. This goal could
be unrealistic in a corporate environment where compat-
ibility is a major concern. Therefore our results represent
an upper bound for security.
7 Ethical Considerations
Our university located in central Europe unfortunately
does not have an ethics board but has a set of guidelines
that we followed in our research. Also, we aligned the
methodology for our user study in related studies with
similar ethical challenges [35, 40, 44].
A fundamental requirement of our university’s ethics
guidelines is to preserve the participants’ privacy and to
limit the collection of person-related data as far as possi-
ble. Therefore, every study participant was assigned an
ID which was used throughout the experiment and for
the online questionnaire. All participants signed consent
forms prior to participating in our study. The consent
form explained the goal of our research, what we ex-
pected from them and how the collected data was used.
The signed consent forms were stored separately and did
not contain the subsequently assigned IDs to make them
unlinkable to their real names.
We refrained from video-recording the participants
during the study as the participants from our pre-study
reported that the awareness of being filmed made them
feel uncomfortable and had a negative impact on their
performance even if the camera was positioned in a non-
obtrusive way.
8 Conclusion
We conducted a lab study with 28 participants to ex-
plore usability challenges in the TLS deployment pro-
cess that lead to insecure configurations. In comparison
to related work, we contributed a study that focuses on
expert users, i.e., administrators who are in charge of se-
curing servers. Additionally, we conducted seven expert
interviews with penetration testers and security auditors
who frequently encounter poorly secured servers during
security audits.
We found that the TLS deployment process consists
of multiple critical steps which, if not done correctly,
lead to insecure communications and put Internet users at
risk for MITM attacks. Furthermore, our results suggest
that even computer scientists who are educated in terms
of privacy-enhancing protocols and information security
need additional support to make informed security deci-
sions and lack an in-depth understanding of the underly-
ing cryptographic fundamentals. Expert users also strug-
gle with the configuration file structure of Apache web
servers and have to put a lot of additional effort into se-
curing default configurations. Our expert interviews un-
derline the ecological validity of the results from our lab
study and shed light on the weaknesses of TLS configu-
rations found in the wild. According to our security audi-
tors, the main concern regarding TLS is interoperability.
They also highlighted that server infrastructures are of-
ten configured with poor defaults and badly maintained
and are therefore not up-to-date.
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A Appendix
Recruitment Questionnaire
• Which of the following directives is used to host
two different websites (www.website1.com and
www.website2.com) within the same Apache web-
server?
– NamedHost
– WebRoot
– VirtualHost
– ServerRoot
• Certificate files are usualy located at?
– /root/ssl/certs
– /etc/ssl/certs
– /tmp/certs
– /var/www/static/certs
• CSR means ...
– common-name signing request
– comodo signing request
– certificate signing request
– cross-site request
• Which is the best file permission for your private
keys on a Linux system?
– 0777
– 0300
– 0664
– 0600
• Which command is used to find out the currently
used IPs?
– ifconfig
– netstat
– ipconfig
– iptables
• Which files can the user www-data read?
– -rw——- root root filname
– -rw——- www www-data filename
– -rwxrwxrwx root root filename
– -rw-rw—- root www-data filename
• Which command is used to switch the user in
Linux?
– sudo
– su
– root
– switchuser
• A symlink is created with which command?
– ls -s TARGET LINK NAME
– symlink TARGET LINK NAME
– ln -s TARGET LINK NAME
– ln TARGET LINK NAME
• TLS uses ...
– symmetric cryptography
– asymmetric cryptography
– pem/der certificates
– X.509
• TLS is ...
– computationally very expensive
– complex to configure correctly
– originally invented by Facebook
– easy to buy using cloud services
• Which of the following commands is used to save a
file in vim (Vi Improved)?
– Strg + S
– Strg + X
– Esc; :s
– Esc; :w
• Which commands restarts the webserver?
– sudo service apache2 restart
– sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 restart
– sudo service webserver restart
– sudo service IIS restart
• The webserver has to have access to?
– The private key used for TLS
– The certificate used for TLS
– The certificate authority private key for TLS
– The certificate signing request used for TLS
• Where are HTML files served by the Apache Web-
server located after default installation?
– /usr/share/nginx/www
– /etc/www
– /var/www
– /home/www
Lab Study Assignment
You are the system administrator at a SME (small and
medium-sized enterprise). Your company runs a web
portal and your boss instructed you to secure the com-
munication by using TLS. Unfortunately you only have
a very limited amount of time because your company will
also soon be under security audit. This is why you should
start right away deploying TLS. Make your configuration
as secure as possible.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the CA we implemented for the
lab experiments.
System Configuration
• The company’s web server (Apache2) is currently
found at http://web.local on Port 80. There is only
HTTP activated. No TLS configuration is made so
far.
• You can connect to the web server with the com-
mand ssh web The username is pi, the password is
raspberry. There is no root password, so you can
just use sudo to execute commans as root user.
• You will have to use a Certificate Authority. You
find a CA at https://ca.local Your client’s Firefox
trusts this CA called TLS Userstudy Root CA. You
can test the certificate validation with this browser.
The DNS names of both servers are locally config-
ured at your client.
Post Lab Study Questionnaire
Demgraphics
• Participant ID (assigned prior to the lab experi-
ments)
• Age
• Gender
• Months of industry experience
Experience with TLS
• Are you currently in charge of a web server?
(Yes, I’m currently administrating a company web
server./ Yes, I’m currently administrating a private
web server./ Yes, I’m currently administrating at a
profit/non-profit association. /No.)
• Have you ever installed and configured SSL/TLS
before? (yes/no)
• Have you ever worked as a system administrator be-
fore? (yes/no)
Reflections on the Study Task
• Did you finish the TLS installation in the given
time? (yes, no, I’m not sure)
• If you didn’t finish the TLS installation in the given
time, which steps are still missing to secure the
communication? (open text)
• How difficult did you find TLS deployment? (Likert
scale: very easy to very difficult)
• What did you find particularly difficult? (open text)
• What do you think are the key usability pitfalls of
TLS deployment? (open text)
• What would you recommend a system administrator
who has to deploy TLS? (open text)
• Is there anything else you would like to let us know?
(open text)
Interview Questions - Expert Interviews
• As an auditor, how do you usually proceed to eval-
uate the security of a TLS configuration?
• What are the main vulnerabilities/configuration
mistakes that you encounter as an auditor?
• What botheres admins/CSOs the most regarding
TLS?
• What are the most critical steps in TLS deployment?
• How should the deployment process be improved?
• What piece of advice would you generally give to
anyone in charge of securing communication over
HTTPS?
Detailed Evaluation Criteria
Grade The overall grade for the configuration with a
valid certificate. The grade is calculated based on the
grading scheme from [2]. The score is based on indi-
vidual ratings for protocol support (30%), key exchange
(30%) and cipher strength (40%). The grade is issued
based on the following cumulative scores:
• A: score >= 80
• B: score >= 65
• C: score >= 50
• D: score >= 35
• E: score >= 20
• F: score < 20
Errors/warnings/highlights. This refers to remarks
that impacted the overall grading. The detailed descrip-
tion of these justifications is shown in Table 3.
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Cipher strength score. This is represented by a num-
ber between 0 and 100, with 100 being the best possible.
The cipher strength score contributes 40% to the overall
grade. As weak symmetric ciphers can be easily broken
by attackers, it is essential to the overall configuration
that strong ciphers are used. SSL Labs evaluate ciphers
based on an average cipher between the strongest and
weakest. The scores are rated as follows:
0 bits (no encryption): 0
< 128 bits (e.g., 40, 56): 20
< 256 bits (e.g., 128, 168): 80
>= 256: 100
Key exchange score. As described in [2], the key ex-
change phase serves two functions: (1) authentication to
verify the identity of the other party and (2) safe gener-
ation and exchange of secret keys to be used for the re-
maining session. Also, exportable key exchanges where
only a part of the key is exchanged can make the ses-
sion keys easier to compromise. Key exchange without
authentication is vulnerable to MITM attacks and allows
an attacker to gain access to the communication chan-
nel. Furthermore, the strength of the server’s private key
is crucial. The stronger it is, the more difficult it is to
break the key exchange phase. Some servers use the pri-
vate key just for authentication and not for the key ex-
change mechanism. Popular algorithms are the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange (DHE) and its elliptic curve ver-
sion (ECDHE). As in [2], the rating is calculated as fol-
lows:
Weak key or anonymous key exchange (e.g., Anonymous
Diffie-Hellman): 0
Key or DH parameter strength < 512 bits: 20
Exportable key exchange limited to 512 bits: 40
Key or DH parameter strength < 1024 bits: 40
Key or DH parameter strength < 2048 bits: 80
Key or DH parameter strength < 4096 bits: 90
Key or DH parameter strength >= 4096 bits: 100
Protocol support score [2]. Several (older) versions of
TLS have known weaknesses or are vulnerable to well-
known attacks. The configuration is graded as follows
with respect to the activated TLS versions. Again, if mul-
tiple versions are supported, the average between the best
and worst protocol score is considered.
SSL 2.0: 0
SSL 3.0: 80
TLS 1.0: 90
TLS 1.1: 95
TLS 1.2: 100
Common name. This refers to the common name field
specified in the CSR which specifies a FQDN (and re-
spective subdomains if applicable) the certificate is is-
sued for.
Key size. This refers to the size of the server’s key pair.
Certificate chain length. This refers to the length of
the certificate chain, including the server’s certificate and
certificates of intermediate CAs, and the certificate of a
root CA trusted by all parties in the chain. Every inter-
mediate CA in the chain holds a certificate issued by the
CA one level above it in the trust hierarchy. In our exam-
ple, the ideal length is 3.
Used provided CA to sign. In order to remove the
bias from different CAs with varying usability, we im-
plemented our own CA and provided the link to this CA
in the assignment. Two participants did not use this CA
and generated self-signed certificates instead.
Encrypted private key indicates whether the server’s
private key was encrypted by the study participant.
SSL 2 – TLS 1.2 indicates which protocol versions are
supported.
RC4 support. To date, RC4 is considered weak and
should therefore not be supported, unless required for
compatibility reasons as found in [10].
Vulnerable to POODLE indicates whether the config-
uration is vulnerable to POODLE [32].
Forward secrecy indicates whether the configuration
supports ciphers with forward secrecy (e.g., ECDHE).
HSTS indicates whether HTTP Strict Transport Secu-
rity is configured. The security benefit of HSTS is that
it forces secure communication with websites that use it
by automatically converting all plain text and disabling
click-through certificate warnings. If a client does not
support HSTS, it simply ignores the header. Hence, acti-
vating HSTS enhances security with minimal effort with-
out impact on compatibility.
HPKP indicates whether Public Key Pinning is used,
which is a useful feature to prevent attacks and making
the public aware of them.
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